In contemporary moral and philosophical discourse, some suggest that moral truth and what is “right” are contingent upon a person’s or society’s ability to adapt to circumstances. This perspective, often influenced by postmodern and new-age ideologies, emphasizes fluidity and pragmatism over objectivity. Proponents of this view argue, for example, that individuals with ADHD demonstrate how adaptations can redefine human flourishing, or that societal changes, such as the increased use of artificial intelligence (AI) in decision-making, reflect evolving moral frameworks. A Thomistic framework, however, challenges this claim by affirming the objective nature of truth, the divine grounding of moral law, and the distinction between teleological purpose and accidental outcomes.
This essay critiques the notion of adaptation as the foundation for moral truth and reality by exploring these three Thomistic principles. While adaptation may reflect resilience or innovation, it cannot redefine the immutable truths of morality and human purpose as grounded in the eternal law.
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The Nature of Truth
Thomas Aquinas defines truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus—the correspondence of the intellect to reality (Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 16, Art. 1). Truth is grounded in the objective order of creation, which reflects the eternal law of God. From this perspective, truth is not contingent upon subjective circumstances or practical outcomes but is an unchanging reality derived from the divine will.
Arguments that place adaptation at the center of truth undermine this understanding by reducing truth to a functional or utilitarian construct. For instance, the claim that societal changes, such as the increased reliance on artificial intelligence in governance or moral decision-making, represent an evolved moral truth conflates adaptation to new technologies with an objective moral order. Similarly, arguments highlighting creative traits in individuals with ADHD or extraordinary sensory adaptations in individuals who are blind demonstrate human resilience but fail to address the ontological grounding of moral truth.
In Thomistic thought, such adaptations may be good in a natural sense but do not redefine the fundamental nature of truth, which remains rooted in the divine order. As Josef Pieper notes, “Truth is not determined by human opinion but by the alignment of human knowledge with the reality willed by God” (The Four Cardinal Virtues, 1966).
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The Grounding of Moral Law
Aquinas’ ethical framework is teleological, meaning it is directed toward an ultimate end (telos): the flourishing of rational beings in union with God (Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 1, Art. 7). Moral law, derived from natural law, is a reflection of the eternal law and provides an objective standard for human actions. Morality is not determined by shifting circumstances but by how actions align with human nature and its ultimate purpose.
When proponents argue that societal adaptations, such as the normalization of remote work in response to technological advancements, represent a new moral reality, they depart from this objective grounding. While such changes may emerge as pragmatic responses to societal needs, they cannot redefine the moral law. For Aquinas, moral goodness is determined by whether an act fulfills the purpose for which human beings were created, not by its perceived utility in a given context.
Similarly, adaptations such as the heightened spatial awareness in individuals who are blind or the exceptional endurance of individuals in survival situations may produce natural goods but do not redefine what is morally or metaphysically right. These traits reflect accidental, rather than essential, aspects of human nature and are subordinate to the overarching purpose of human life.
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Teleology and Accidental Consequences
Thomistic philosophy distinguishes between a being’s essential purpose (teleology) and its accidental features or outcomes. Every being has a final cause or purpose that defines its nature and directs its actions. Human nature is ordered toward rationality, virtue, and the ultimate good of communion with God.
Adaptations, while often beneficial, are accidental rather than essential features of human existence. For example, the ability of individuals with dyslexia to develop advanced problem-solving skills, or of communities to develop innovative ways of preserving resources in response to environmental challenges, are examples of adaptations to specific conditions. While these traits may contribute positively to human flourishing in particular contexts, they do not alter the teleological purpose of human nature.
Aquinas argues that the ultimate purpose of human life is not contingent upon circumstantial adaptations but is directed toward the eternal good. As Edward Feser notes, “The good for human beings must be understood in light of what human beings essentially are: rational animals ordered to truth, virtue, and ultimately God” (Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide, 2009). Adaptation, while valuable, cannot redefine this ultimate purpose.
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The Thomistic Critique of Relativism
The argument for adaptation as the foundation of moral truth reflects a form of moral relativism, which denies the existence of objective moral norms. For Aquinas, relativism is incompatible with the natural law, which provides a universal standard rooted in human nature and the eternal law. Relativism reduces morality to a series of subjective or situational judgments, undermining the coherence of moral reasoning.
Examples of adaptation, such as the societal embrace of remote work, the resilience of communities in environmental crises, or the sensory strengths of individuals who are blind, highlight human capacity to flourish under diverse conditions. However, these adaptations must be understood within the broader framework of human nature’s teleological purpose. They do not justify a relativistic approach to morality, as they remain contingent goods that point to, but do not redefine, the universal principles of the natural law.
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Conclusion
From a Thomistic perspective, the claim that moral truth, reality, and rightness pertain to adaptation is deeply flawed. Truth is grounded in the correspondence of the intellect to reality, not in contingent or pragmatic circumstances. Moral law is rooted in the eternal law and the teleological purpose of human nature, not in adaptive responses to challenges.
While adaptations—such as the heightened creativity of individuals with ADHD, the resilience of communities during environmental challenges, or the sensory strengths of individuals who are blind—may reflect natural goods, they do not redefine moral truth or reality. Instead, these traits should be appreciated as expressions of human resilience and divine providence within the unchanging framework of truth and morality as established by God.
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References
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Benziger Bros., 1947.
Feser, Edward. Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide. Oneworld Publications, 2009.
Pieper, Josef. The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance. University of Notre Dame Press, 1966.
Pinckaers, Servais. The Sources of Christian Ethics. Catholic University of America Press, 1995.
Rhonheimer, Martin. Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy. Fordham University Press, 2000.